Military Vehicle Antenna (Vehicular antennas)
Suzhou Rebes claims to have partnerships with multiple US companies, importing and re-selling their products in the PRC ( , Accessed February 2023). It also claims to serve as an official PRC representative for some of those US firms, many of whom are industry leaders in the field of RF and microwave cables and components ( , Accessed February 2023). Many also supply products to the US military, advertising their reliability and ruggedness in the face of modern combat. [1] Documents available on Suzhou Rebes’ website indicate that at least some of its US imports are indeed military-grade high-end cables ( , Accessed February 2023). [2]
Far from downplaying the military potential of these US imports, Suzhou Rebes cites their utility to the military as part of its pitch to PRC customers. Suzhou Rebes cites cables from one US company as well suited for, among other things, “military communications, radar, missile guidance, satellites, and aviation” ( , accessed February 2023). Another US product is marketed as being suitable for “satellites, phased array radars, electronic warfare, and signals intelligence,” among other applications ( , accessed February 2023). And a third company’s product is advertised as being suitable for use in supercomputers, which are currently restricted for export to the PRC ( , October 21, 2022; , accessed June 2023). A visit to the latter product’s website suggests that it is used in US Cray supercomputers (used by the US Department of Defense and the US Armed Forces), as well as in an array of advanced weaponry such as the F-35 fifth-generation combat aircraft and Tomahawk Missile ( , Accessed June 2023).
Deleted Press Release Burnishes Military Links
Suzhou Rebes makes clear that many of these imported products from the United States are sold on to military end users in the PRC. For example, in one since-deleted press release from its website, Suzhou Rebes celebrates the successful sale of a ka-band cable assembly to a PLA communications unit for use in a “radar project” ( , accessed June 2021). While the press release claims that Suzhou Rebes manufactured this piece of equipment itself, in the very next paragraph it claims that all of its cables utilize imported electrical cables from US and European companies, and even specifically names several of these: “All of our cables use imported electric cables from firms such as MICRO-COAX, TIMES, GORE, Harbour, ATM, Tensolite, Huber+ Suhner, and IW (线缆全部采用 [list of firms] 等进口电缆).”
The press release then claims that Suzhou Rebes has agreements to supply cable assemblies to numerous major PRC defense companies, including subsidiaries of military electronics conglomerate China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC; 中国电子科技集团公司), military aviation conglomerate the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC; 中国航空工业集团公司), and several subsidiaries of the aerospace and ballistic missile giants the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC; 中国航天科技集团有限公司) and the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC; 中国航天科工集团有限公司). Specifically, it names CETC’s 10th, 13th, 14th, 22nd, 29th, 38th, 54th, and 63rd Research Institutes, all of which are involved in the development of military electronic products, AVIC’s Shenyang and Harbin subsidiaries, CASC’s 5th, 8th, and 9th Academies, and CASIC’s 2nd Academy. It also claims to have agreements with two PLA academic institutions, the National Defense University and Naval University of Engineering, as well as several civilian academic institutions with close ties to the PRC military establishment. This latter group includes Beihang University, one of the “Seven Sons of National Defense,” a grouping of ostensibly civilian universities known for their close ties to the defense establishment and responsible for a high proportion of the PRC’s military research ( , November 25, 2019).
Many of these institutions would have an obvious use for the kind of high-end cable assemblies Suzhou Rebes provides. For instance, the press release mentions supplying the CETC 14th Research Institute, which is one of PRC’s most important research institutes for military radars ( , January 12, 2020). Likewise, the CETC 54th Research Institute is dedicated to research of tactical communications and other military electronics ( , September 8, 2021). The two AVIC subsidiaries mentioned in the press release, the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation and Harbin Aircraft Industry Group, are responsible for many of the PLA’s combat aircraft and helicopters, respectively ( , January 22). Additionally, the listed CASC and CASIC subsidiaries are heavily involved in the development of missiles and air defense systems, as well as the PRC’s space program. This suggests that US technology may have contributed to the development of some or all of these military end products.
Perhaps most concerning, the press release claims that Suzhou Rebes also has an agreement to supply components to the “Mianyang 9th Academy,” a euphemism for the China Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP; 中国工程物理研究院). CAEP is the primary research institute for the PRC’s nuclear weapons program ( , accessed June 2021). Suzhou Rebes’ involvement in nuclear weapons research is seemingly confirmed in another press release, celebrating a new contract that allowed it “to enter the high-end nuclear industry for national defense (进入了我国国防领域高端的核工业领域)” ( , accessed February 2023).
Conclusion
Suzhou Rebes’ own website and statements make clear that US companies are selling critical technology to the PRC that is destined for its defense complex. There is no evidence that any of the US companies with products being sold by Suzhou Rebes are aware of these secondary sales and, on their face, these companies appear to take US Government export controls seriously (see, for example, , June 2018; , accessed February 2023). Some brief due diligence would raise awareness of the likely endpoints of their sales, however. At least one US company advertises products on its PRC website that meet the US military’s MIL-DTL-17 standard ( , accessed February 2023). [3] These companies may believe that Suzhou Rebes’ absence from any US export screening lists makes the sales unproblematic. While Suzhou Rebes itself is not listed on any US Government export screening lists, however, many of the institutions it partners with, including CETC, AVIC, CASC, CASIC, and CAEP, are on the US Department of Commerce Entity List for export control ( , March 2, 2023).
Antennas for Military vehicles or Vehicular antennas for heavy-duty use, such as in the forest or in remote locations on armored vehicles, and low-profile antennas for civil vehicles. Communication and EW applications are examples of applications.Wideband mobile VHF antennas with frequency ranges of 30 to 88 MHz or 30 to 108 MHz are designed primarily for use in heavy-duty mobile applications.
Typically, the antenna is made up of three major parts: the antenna base, the lower part, and the upper part. Some antennas have two sections, while others have three. The long-lasting antenna base with GPS (optional).
The stainless steel spring absorbs shocks and vibrations while also protecting the antenna from collisions.
Both radiating pieces are comprised of composite materials, which allow for exceptional strength and roughness even in the harshest environments.
PRC companies often see the Chinese language as the “first level of encryption,” making public statements that, if translated, could get them in trouble. More often than not, they are correct in assuming that no one will translate these statements. As the US Government begins to enforce its export control regime with more stringency, cases such as that of Suzhou Rebes show that it still has a long way to go. Limited resources could nevertheless go a long way—a single Mandarin speaker with 15 minutes and an internet connection can easily uncover the facts necessary to make the link between US technology exports and their destinations in the PRC’s defense complex. While further work must be done to assess how widespread PRC circumvention of export controls via middlemen is, its emergence in cases involving a wide range of controlled products suggests that it is a common, and likely effective, tactic that should receive additional attention.
Notes
[1] See, for example:
- Ted Prema, “Powering high-performance, ultrareliable RF systems in military electronics,” Military Embedded Systems, 3 December 2021, ;
- “GORE-FLIGHT Microwave Assemblies for Defense Aircraft,” GORE, Accessed February 2023, ;
- “Micro-Coax, a Carlisle Brand,” CarliseIT, Accessed February 2023, ;
- “Relentlessly Pursuing Discovery,” CarlisleIT, Accessed February 2023, ;
- “Six cables available to support F-35 ramp rate to full production,” Harbour Industries, 21 January 2020, https://harbourind.com/latest-news/82-f-35-cables.
[2] The product in this source is described as MIL-DTL-17 grade, the official designation for US military-standard cables. See: “MIL-DTL-17 Requirements for Hi-Rel/MIL-SPEC Coaxial Cable Assemblies and a Note on RG Coax,” Military and Aerospace Electronics, 3 March 2019, .
[3] An English version of the manual can be found at: .
來自: https://jamestown.org/program/prc-use-of-middlemen-to-circumvent-us-government-export-controls-the-c
Fei Teng Wireless Technology Co. Ltd
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